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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The District Court and this Court have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Section 78A-3-102(3)(j). This is an appeal from a final judgment
entered by the District Court on January 12, 2010.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court properly granted Appellee Thomas Warne's

("Thomas") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
2007 UT App. 407 % 34, 175 P.3d 572 (holding that the appellate court review the
trial court's ruling on summary judgment for correctness).
2.

Whether the trial court acted within its discretion to not consider

Appellant's argument related to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 because Appellant
Jeffrey Warne ("Jeffrey") failed to raise the argument prior to the trial court hearing
on Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
2007 UT App. 407 ^ 34, 175 P.3d at 579 (holding that the appellate court review the
trial court's ruling on summary judgment for correctness).
3.

Whether the trial court properly denied Jeffrey's Motion to Alter or

Amend Judgment.
Standard of review: abuse of discretion. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434
(Utah 1993) (holding that the trial court's determination on motion or action to
1
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modify final judgment will be reversed only upon showing of abuse of discretion.)
Appellant cites Mann v. Fredrickson, 2006 UT App. 475 16, 153 P.3d 768 for the
proposition that the correctness standard applies, but the Utah Court of Appeals was
addressing a motion for new trial made to a judge new to the case, not a motion to
modify a judgment after a dispositive motion decided as a matter of law.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Appellant raises Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 and Utah Code Ann. §75-7-605,
but as discussed herein, neither statute determines the outcome of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
RELEVANT FACTS1
On or about July 15, 1991, Ira B. Wame ("Ira") and Avis P. Warne ("Avis")
executed virtually identical trusts and wills. Ira and Avis were the parents of the
parties Thomas Warne ("Thomas") and Jeffrey Wame ("Jeffrey"). Both of the Trusts
contain identical Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2, which state:

1

Jeffrey dedicates several pages of his Brief to the recitation of his version of
highly contested factual issues in a transparent attempt to affect this Court's sense of
the underlying equities and to make himself appear more sympathetic. In the process,
Jeffrey attempts to paint Thomas as a thief and a fraud. Jeffrey's allegations are
utterly false. They have been shown to be false in the probate of Marian Smith's
estate as well as in prior litigation between Thomas and Jeffrey. Thomas will not
stoop to Jeffrey's level and sling the mud back, because those factual issues are
completely irrelevant to the matter before this Court. For purposes of his summary
judgment motion, Thomas acknowledged that the trial court had to accept as true
Jeffrey's allegations that Ira intended to disinherit Thomas and that Ira was competent
and was not unduly influenced in executing the Partial Revocation and Amendment.
That is as far as this Court needs to go with regard to the history among Ira, Thomas
and Jeffrey.
2
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3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive,
the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this
Trust in whole or in part, including the principal, and the present or
past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation or
amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written
instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this
instrument shall be effective only when such change is delivered in
writing to the then acting Trustee or Trustees. On the revocation of
this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of
revocation, all of the Trust property.
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries
are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by
death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the
rights and privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by
the Trustees named herein in their fiduciary capacity.
(R. 333-334.)
Also on or about July 15, 1991, Ira executed the "Last Will and Testament of
Ira B. Warne." (R. 353-357.) Paragraph 2.1 of Ira's Will states:
(a) Tangible Personal Property - Gift by Written Statement. I
give my tangible personal property ... in accordance with a written
statement signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at
my death.
(b) Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property
not effectively disposed of by such written statement ... to my spouse if
my spouse survives me. If my spouse fails to survive me, I give such
property to my issue who survive me....
(R. 354.)
Avis died in 1998, never having modified her Trust. (R. 151.)
In 2002, this Court decided Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190
(attached hereto as Exhibit A), in which this Court construed trust language identical
to that quoted above. This Court held that the exclusive method for completely
3
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terminating a vested beneficial interest under such language was through a_complete
revocation of the trust and a return of all of the trust assets to the settlor. Id % 14.
On or about May 9, 2003, Ira executed a document entitled "Partial Revocation
and Amendment to The Ira B. Warne Family Protection Trust." ("Partial Revocation
and Amendment')(R. 360-366.)2 In the fourth recital, Ira stated that he "specifically
wishes to preempt the results of the case Banks v. Means. . . . " In the fifth recital, Ira
provided his own interpretation of Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2. Ira concluded that "the
word 'revoked' found in paragraph 3.2 in fact means 'revoked in whole or in part...."
(R. 360.)
Paragraph A of the Partial Revocation and Amendment set forth the
"Provisions to be Revoked" and Paragraph B stated the "Provisions to be Inserted".
All of the "revoked" provisions are replaced with an "inserted" provision. (R. 360,
361.)
The Partial Revocation and Amendment only amends Article V and Paragraphs
1.1, 1.2, 3.2 and 7.63 of Ira's Trust and does not even purport to amend the entire
Trust. Ira amended Paragraph 1.1 by restating the purpose of the Trust. He amended
2

The Partial Revocation and Amendment uses the terms "revocation" and
"amendment" interchangeably. The last recital paragraph states, "the Grantor hereby
revokes the Trust Agreement, in part, as follows... and further amends the Trust
Agreement as set forth herein...." The last two paragraphs of the document state
"THIS AMENDMENT TO THE TRUST AGREEMENT..." and "Grantor and
Trustee have executed this Amendment...." Additionally, the Attestation and
Statement of Witnesses refers to the document as "Amendment To The Ira B. Warne
Family Protection Trust (the 'Amendment')."
3
In Paragraph B, the Partial Revocation and Amendment refers to the Trustee
Provisions as being Article VI and the paragraph captioned "Trustees" as
paragraph 6.6, but they are Article VII and paragraph 7.6.
4
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Paragraph 1.2 by removing Thomas as a primary beneficiary. He amended
Paragraph 3.2 by changing the beneficial interests from vested to unvested. He
amended Article V by having all of the Trust assets distributed to a "Jeffrey D. Warne
Beneficiary Trust" and then distributed to Jeffrey. He amended Paragraph 7.6 by
removing Thomas as a successor trustee.
Also on or about May 9, 2003, Ira executed the "Codicil to the Last Will and
Testament of Ira B. Wame. (R. 482-484.) Ira's Codicil modifies Paragraph 3.1 of his
Will by removing Thomas as co-personal representative and naming Jeffrey as the
sole personal representative. Ira's Codicil makes no other changes to Ira's Will.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: NATURE,
PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION
On May 12, 2008, Thomas filed a complaint in the Third District Court against
Jeffrey. Thomas' Complaint contained three causes of action: (1) a demand to deliver
Ira's Will to Thomas, (2) a claim undue of influence and (3) a request for declaratory
relief regarding Ira's competence (R. 1-6.)
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, on August 8, 2008, Thomas filed an
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint contained three causes of action: (1)
a request for declaratory relief regarding the validity of the Partial Revocation and
Amendment and Ira's Codicil, (2) a claim of undue influence regarding Ira's
execution of the Partial Revocation and Amendment, and (3) a request for declaratory
relief regarding Avis' Trust. (R. 45-53.)

5
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On November 21, 2008, Thomas filed a Second Amended Complaint. The
only change between the First and Second Amended Complaints was the designation
of the parties as individuals and as trustees of Ira's and Avis' Trusts. The amendment
was required after the trial court granted Jeffrey's Motion for Joinder of Indispensible
Party. (R. 149-157.)
On December 9, 2008, Jeffrey filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 162172.) Jeffrey's Counterclaim contained two causes of action: (1) a request for a
declaration that Jeffrey was the sole trustee and beneficiary of Ira's Trust and (2) a
reformation of Ira's Trust under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 to comport with the
Partial Revocation and Amendment.
On July 14, 2009, after the close of discovery, Thomas filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 328-330) and a Memorandum in Support of the
motion (R. 317-327.) Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought
judgment that: (1) the Partial Revocation and Amendment was invalid under Banks v.
Means, (2) despite Ira's Codicil and the Partial Revocation and Amendment, Thomas
was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate, and (3) Thomas and
Jeffrey were equal beneficiaries and co-trustees of Avis' Trust. (R. 321.)
On October 26, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on Thomas' Motion.
(R. 560.) At the hearing, Jeffrey's counsel provided the trial court judge and Thomas'
counsel with binders that included highlighted copies of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605
(R. 560 p. 9). Jeffrey's counsel then argued for the first time that Utah Code

6
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Ann. § 75-7-605 saved the Partial Revocation and Amendment from this Court's
ruling in Banks v. Means. (R. 560 pp. 25-27.)
On November 18, 2009, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision
granting Thomas' Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety (R. 518.-552D.) The
trial court's Memorandum Decision did not address Jeffrey's new argument under
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-605.
On December 2, 2009, Jeffrey filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or,
in the Alternative to Certify Ruling as Final Pursuant to Rule 54(b) (R. 523-525) and a
Memorandum in Support of the Motion (R. 526-535). Thomas stipulated to certifying
the ruling as final, but opposed the motion to alter or amend (R. 536-542.)
On January 12, 2010, the trial court4 denied Jeffrey's motion to alter or amend.
(R. 552A-552C.) Among other things, the trial court held Jeffrey's Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-605 argument was procedurally improper because Jeffrey raised it for the
first time at the trial court hearing of Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the trial court granted Jeffrey's request to
designate the trial court's ruling as a final order for appeal.
On February 3, 2010, Jeffrey filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 557.) Jeffrey
appealed all of the trial court's summary judgment except for the portion dealing with
Avis' Trust.

4

At some time prior to the ruling on Jeffrey's Motion, this case was transferred
from the Honorable Robert P. Faust to the Honorable Paul G. Maughan.
7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that the Partial Revocation and Amendment was
invalid. Beginning with Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.2d 1190, this Court has
repeatedly held that language identical to that found in Ira's Trust requires a complete
revocation of the Trust and a return of all assets to the settlor in order to terminate a
vested beneficial interest. The Partial Revocation and Amendment is an amendment,
not a complete revocation, so it does not comply with the requirements of Ira's Trust
or with Banks v. Means.
The trial court also properly ignored Jeffrey's argument under Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-605. Jeffrey intentionally failed to raise the argument until the trial court
hearing, which gave Thomas' counsel no realistic opportunity to respond. Even if this
Court allows Jeffrey to proceed with his argument, the statute does not save the
Partial Revocation and Amendment because Ira's Trust states an expressly exclusive
method of terminating a vested remainder interest, which is a complete revocation of
the Trust. The Partial Revocation and Amendment is an amendment, and even if it
could be considered a partial revocation, does not substantially comply with the
excusive method the Trust requires.
The trial court also properly refused to reform Ira's Trust under Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-415 because Jeffrey presented no evidence that Ira was under a
mistake of law or fact when he signed the Trust. The relevant time for determining
Ira's intent is when he signed the Trust in 1991, not when he signed the Partial
Revocation and Amendment in 2003. But even if Ira's understanding at the later time
8
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was relevant, he expressly stated that he understood Banks v. Means but chose to
ignore the exclusive method his Trust required to terminate a vested beneficial
interest.
Finally, the trial court properly ruled Ira's Will determined the distribution of
Ira's personal property because Ira's Codicil did not modify the operative provision of
Ira's Will. Ira's Will unambiguously leaves his personal property to Thomas and
Jeffrey equally. Jeffrey's argument related to Schedule A of Ira's Trust was not
raised below and was thus waived.
ARGUMENT
I.

BANKS V. MEANS AND ITS PROGENY CONTROL THIS
CASE.

The Partial Revocation and Amendment attempts to completely divest Thomas
of his vested interest as a beneficiary of Ira's Trust and to remove Thomas as a
successor Trustee of Ira's Trust, while leaving the remainder of Trust in place.
Section 3.2 of the Ira Trust states:
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries
are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as
this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and privileges
hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustees named
herein in their fiduciary capacity.
In Banks v. Means, this Court held that this exact language barred the complete
divestment of a beneficiary's vested interest in the trust without completely revoking
the trust and returning the trust assets to the settlor. Id. ^| 15.

9
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In Banks, the settlor executed the "Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust" in
1992, which named her children as the beneficiaries and the successor trustees. Id. f
2. Section 3.2 of the Banks Trust was identical to Section 3.2 of the Ira Trust. Id. <[
4. In August 1999, the settlor executed an amendment to the Banks Trust in which
she designated her sister as the primary beneficiary of the entire trust and also named
her sister as the initial successor trustee.
The Banks children sued their aunt, claiming the amendment was invalid. The
district court granted the children's summary judgment motion, and this Court
affirmed. This Court held that "a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust
only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the
trust." Id. \ 9. After reviewing the trust language, this Court concluded that "Ms.
Banks reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified how such
changes were to be accomplished, and created vested beneficiary interests that could
be divested only though a complete revocation of the trust." Id. \ 14.
This Court then turned to an analysis of the trust amendment to see if it
complied with the requirements of the trust. This Court found the beneficiaries held a
vested beneficial interest, which it defined as "a completed, consummated right for
present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute...." Id. fn. 3.
This Court found the amendment attempted to completely divest the children of their
vested beneficial interest, and, according to the terms of the trust, the only way to
accomplish such a result was to: (1) completely revoke the trust and (2) return all of
the trust assets to the settlor. Id. ^ 15. This Court found the amendment was not a
10
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complete revocation and the assets had not been returned to the settlor, so neither
requirement was met, and the amendment was invalid. Id. f 16.
This Court followed Banks with Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake),
2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589. In 1987, Mr. Flake created a trust naming his soon-to-be
wife and his children from a prior marriage as the beneficiaries. In 1998, Mr. Flake
executed a complete restatement of the trust, which reduced but did not eliminate his
wife's share. After Mr. Flake's death, Mrs. Flake sued the trust, claiming the 1998
restatement was invalid for a number of reasons, including the holding of Banks.
Mrs. Flake argued the 1998 restatement was not a complete revocation, so it could not
reduce her remainder interest in the trust.
This Court disagreed. This Court found, unlike the Banks trust, the Flake trust
did not require a complete revocation and under such language, "there is no
requirement of revocation where the beneficial interest is simply modified or
amended but not terminated." Id. \ 17.
Thus, in Flake, this Court affirmed its holding in Banks, but distinguished both
the trust language and the nature of the change to the beneficial interest. However, in
the case at bar, the trust language and the attempted complete termination of the
beneficial interest are the same as were present in Banks,
In Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750, this Court again confirmed
Banks, This Court stated, "Under the clear precedent of Banks and Flake, if the 2002
amendment completely divested Jack of any interest in the trust, the amendment
would violate a condition placed upon the power to amend because Leona failed to
11
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revoke the trust first." Id. <fl 13. This Court found the amendment in Hoggan was not
a complete divestment, so the trustor did not have to revoke the trust first. Id. \ 16.
Thus, Banks and its progeny have consistently held that to completely divest
Thomas of his vested beneficial interest, the language in Ira's Trust requires: (1) a
complete revocation of the Trust and (2) a return of all of the trust assets to Ira. Ira
did neither of those things in the Partial Revocation and Amendment, so it was
ineffective.
Jeffrey attempts to use several irrelevant factual issues to distinguish the Banks
line of cases from this case. First, Jeffrey states that "Ms. Banks never had a falling
out with any of her children." Jeffrey's Brief, p. 20 fn. 4. There is nothing in Banks
to support this assertion, and it is irrelevant. Both Ira and Ms. Banks intended to
completely terminate vested interests. The reasons behind their intentions make no
difference.
Jeffrey also notes that Ira signed the Partial Revocation and Amendment four
and one-half years before his death, whereas in Banks, the settlor signed the
amendment two weeks before her death. This distinction is also irrelevant. In Banks,
this Court did not rely on the length of time between the amendment and the settlor's
death. This Court relied on the trust language and the terms of the amendment,
nothing more.
Jeffrey claims "there is no evidence even suggesting that Ira was persuaded or
compelled in any way by anyone to sign the Partial Revocation." Jeffrey's Brief,
p. 21. That is false, but irrelevant. There is substantial evidence to show that Jeffrey
12
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persuaded Ira to disinherit Thomas, and that the Partial Revocation and Amendment
was the result of Jeffrey's undue influence on Ira. However, those facts are not
relevant to the determination of this appeal. The reasons behind Ira's attempt to
disinherit Thomas are irrelevant.
Jeffrey also relies on the letter Ira purportedly wrote shortly before his death
that states the reasons he disinherited Thomas. Again, this is irrelevant, because his
reasons do not matter under Banks. Moreover, Jeffrey admitted in his deposition that
Ira could not have known about several of the purported reasons at the time he
executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment (R. 505-506.) Thus, even if that
letter were relevant, it would show Ira's lack of competence and Jeffrey's undue
influence.
Next, Jeffrey argues that the differences between the "amendment" in Banks
and the Partial Revocation and Amendment here are enough to cause a different
result. Jeffrey notes that, unlike the settlor in Banks, Ira amended paragraphs 1.1 and
1.2 of Ira's Trust, which stated the purpose of the Trust and identified the
beneficiaries of the Trust. Ira also amended paragraph 3.2, which states the beneficial
interests are vested and states how such interests can be terminated.
These are meaningless distinctions. As discussed more fully below, the Partial
Revocation and Amendment is not a revocation, it is an amendment. Ira did not
remove anything from the Trust, he merely changed the language of the Trust. That is
an amendment.

13
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In Banks, this Court held "revocation ... is not the same as an amendment or
modification. Id. Tf 12. As discussed below, this Court has held three times that
paragraph 3.2 requires a complete revocation and a return of all assets to the settlor to
completely terminate a vested interest. Jeffrey asks this Court to allows settlor to
amend away the provisions creating the vested interest. That is akin to allowing a
settlor to modify an irrevocable trust by changing the provision that states the trust is
irrevocable. Following Jeffrey's argument would render the term "vested remainder"
meaningless.
Essentially, this Court has held that, under the terms of Ira's Trust, when a
beneficial interest is vested, it is a permanent part of the trust and cannot be removed.
The settlor can revoke the trust, which renders the vested interest worthless, but the
settlor cannot amend away the vested interest while keeping the trust alive.
Jeffrey also notes the Partial Revocation and Amendment states, "Grantor
specifically wishes to preempt the results of the case of Banks v. Means .. ." and
gives its own interpretation of Section 3.2 (R. 360.) As the trial court found, settlors
are bound by this Court's interpretation of trust language. Settlors cannot devise their
own interpretation of trust language contrary to this Court's interpretation. (R. 520.)
Jeffrey cites In re Gerber, 652 P.2d 937 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that
the courts should carry out the settlor's intention. This begs the question: which
intention? Ira's intention when he executed his Trust, or his intention 12 years later
when he executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment? By Jeffrey's logic, there
could be no irrevocable trusts or vested remainders. The terms of all trusts would be
14
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subject to the settlor's current intention. Such a decision is contrary to settled law and
to the best interests of settlors and beneficiaries alike.
For all of these reasons, Banks v. Means is indistinguishable from and controls
this matter. This Court should reaffirm Banks and find that Ira's Partial Revocation
and Amendment is ineffectual.
II.

JEFFREY WAIVED HIS ARGUMENT RELATED TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605 BY FAILING TO RAISE IT
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL COURT HEARING ON THOMAS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Jeffrey's counsel raised Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 as a defense to the
applicability of Banks v. Means for the first time at the trial court hearing on Thomas'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This argument did not appear in any of the
briefing Jeffrey filed in connection with the partial summary judgment motion.
Appellate courts need not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral
argument before the appellate court. State v. Babbell 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989).
The purpose of this rule is to protect the opposing party from issues to which they
have no real ability to respond. In State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App. 381, 993 P.2d 894,
the Utah Court of Appeals refused to consider an argument first raised at oral
argument before that court. The court reasoned, "[T]his rule protects the opposing
party, which receives no notice as to any issues not found in the docketing statement
or briefs and therefore has no chance to prepare to refute the unbriefed issues at oral
argument with a reasoned analysis supported by legal authority." Id. ^ 4, fn. 2.
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The same reasoning justifies a similar rule applicable to trial court hearings.
Thomas had no chance to prepare a challenge to Jeffrey's argument because Jeffrey
chose to present it for the first time at the trial court hearing. It would have been
unfair for the trial court to address Jeffrey's argument when Thomas had no real
opportunity to respond. Since the trial court properly determined that Jeffrey waived
the argument, it was not preserved for appeal.
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied this logic to trial court proceedings.
In Tomasko v. Ira H. Weinstock, P.C., 2009 WL 4897744 (3d Cir.), the defendant
appealed the district court's award of attorney fees to the plaintiff. Defendant did not
raise certain arguments until oral argument before the district court. The Court of
Appeals held, "[W]e find that the specific objections that [defendant] raised for the
first time at oral argument in the District Court have been waived. It would be unfair
to permit [defendant] to prevail on arguments raised for the first time at oral
argument, a method of proceeding which can deprive one's opponent of any
meaningful opportunity to respond." Id at 7.
Federal district courts have similarly found they need not consider issues raised
for the first time at oral argument. In Johnson v. General Dynamics Information
Technology, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (D.N.H. 2009), the court held, "This
court generally will not consider theories raised for the first time at oral argument, out
of fairness to adverse parties and the court." See also Rice Corp. v. Grain Bd. Of
Iraq, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 (E.D.Cal. 2008); Ramirez v. Salvation Army, 2006
WL 1867722, p. 9 (N.D.Cal.).
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In this case, Jeffrey did not raise the argument based on a question from the
judge, nor was the argument an epiphany of his counsel during the hearing. As
Jeffrey's Brief states, he came to court well prepared to raise the argument for the first
time at the hearing. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 14. Jeffrey brought notebooks to the hearing
for the court and opposing counsel containing the statute highlighted at the provisions
he felt most beneficial to his argument.
Jeffrey could have notified Thomas of this argument before the hearing or
could have requested additional briefing when he discovered the new argument. At a
minimum, Jeffrey could have sent the notebook to Thomas before the hearing.
Jeffrey chose to do none of those things. He made the conscious decision to keep the
new argument from Thomas until oral argument, when Thomas had no realistic ability
to respond.5
None of the Utah cases Jeffrey cites directly deal with this issue. In In re
Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1997), and Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), this Court ruled that certain arguments
were raised too late to be reviewed on appeal. In both cases, this Court merely noted
there was no record of whether the arguments were raised at the trial court hearings.
This Court did not hold in either case that the trial court must address an argument

5

Jeffrey notes that Thomas' counsel briefly responded to Jeffrey's new argument
at the trial court hearing. The ability to make an "off the cuff response is hardly a
reasonable opportunity to rebut Jeffrey's premeditated surprise argument. Jeffrey
also notes that Thomas' counsel did not use the word "object" in that response, but
Thomas' counsel made clear that Jeffrey's argument was new and unexpected.
(R. 560, p. 27.)
17
936498 1

raised for the first time at a trial court hearing, or that such an argument is preserved
for appeal. The issue was not before the Court in either case. €
In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998) this Court held
that, "In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first
raise the issue with the trial court." Id. at 847 (emphasis added). Groberg v. Housing
Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015, 2003 UT App. 67, also dealt with an appeal after a
trial. Neither case addressed whether an argument is preserved for appeal if it is raised
for the first time at the trial court hearing of a motion for summary judgment.
In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) this Court sua
sponte considered a statute that neither party raised. This Court decided that public
policy aspects of the case required considering the statute. Id. at 168. Jeffrey has not
claimed there are any public policy aspects to this case, and there are none. Thurston
did not address the preservation of arguments for appeal. Nor did Thurston hold (as
Jeffrey implies) that the trial court violated public policy by failing to consider a
statute neither party raised.
The cases from outside Utah are also inapposite. In Fraternal Order of Police
v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the court noted that a party can
"waive the waiver" of an issue if the party fails to note that the opponent did not raise
6

Jeffrey misstates the holding of Franklin Financial, asserting that "this Court
recognized that it is possible to raise an argument orally at a hearing on a motion for
summary judgment, holding that the party asserting that the issue had been preserved
is required to provide a complete record to establish that the is was in fact raised
during the hearing." Jeffrey's Brief, p. 30. Franklin Financial only held that a new
argument cannot be raised before the Supreme Court, and noted that the appellant had
not provided a trial court hearing transcript. 659 P.2d at 1045.
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an issue before the Court of Appeals until its reply brief. Id. at 903. The court's
discussion of allowing arguments to be raised for the first time during oral argument
is dicta. Id. at 902. In Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ariz., Inc. v. McKinney, 946
P.2d 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2006)
and McGinely v. Bank of America, 109 P.3d 1146 (Kan. 2005), the Arizona and
Virginia Courts of Appeals and Kansas Supreme Court did not address the fairness of
allowing new arguments to be raised at the trial court hearing, which is central to
Utah's rule as it applies to appellate courts.
If this Court allows Jeffrey to proceed with this argument on appeal, it will be
condoning the tactic of intentionally raising arguments for the first time at the trial
court hearing. It is quite likely counsel in future cases will take advantage of that
tactic. Indeed, it would be against the interests of the client to fully brief arguments
prior to the trial court hearing. Doing so will only provide opposing counsel with a
free advance view of one's arguments.
The Court should not endorse Jeffrey's intentional withholding of an argument
until the trial court hearing. Rather, the Court should affirm the trial court's refusal to
consider Jeffrey's argument related to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) and should find
the argument was not preserved for appeal. 7

7

Jeffrey states that the trial court erred in denying his Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion to alter or amend because the trial court did not address Jeffrey's new
argument on the merits when ruling on Jeffrey's motion. Jeffrey's Brief p. 28. But
Jeffrey provides no authority that a trial court has an obligation to hear an argument
under Rule 59(e) that was raised for the first time and disregarded as untimely at the
trial court hearing of the underlying motion. Thus, the only issue is whether the trial
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III.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-605(3) DOES NOT SUPERCEDE
BANKS V. MEANSNOR SAVE THE PARTIAL
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT FROM THE
APPLICATION OF BANKS V MEANS.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Jeffrey somehow did properly raise the issue,
the statute does not save the Partial Revocation and Amendment.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)8 states:
The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the
terms of the trust; or
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the
method provided is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to
the trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have
passed according to the terms of the trust; or
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of the settlor's intent.
Subparagraph (b) does not apply here. Jeffrey does not argue that it does, and
this Court has found at least three times that a complete revocation is the exclusive
means to completely terminate a vested beneficial interest. In Banks, this Court held,
"Ms. Banks reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified how

court was obligated to address Jeffrey's argument when he raised it for the first time
at the trial court hearing on Thomas' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
8
The only reported case citing Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) is Davis v. Young,
2008 UT App. 246, 190 P.3d 23. There, the grandson of the settlors attempted to
transfer trust assets to himself by a quitclaim deed purportedly signed by his
grandparents, the settlors of the trust. The court held that to be valid, the quitclaim
deed had to be "an effective revocation or transfer under the terms of the Trust."
Id % 12. The trial court held Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) did not apply and the
quitclaim deed did not comply with the common law standard for a revocation or
transfer. The court did not determine whether the statute applied or not, but held the
deed did not comply with either the common law or the statutory standard of a
revocation.
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such changes were to be accomplished, and created vested beneficiary interests that
could be divested only through a complete revocation of the trust." 2002 UT 65 f
14 (emphasis added). In Flake, this Court reiterated, "We held in Banks that
revocation was required when terminating a vested beneficial interest," 2003 UT 17
\\1 (emphasis added). In Hoggan, this court held such language "required a
complete revocation to divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests." 2007 UT
78 Tf 11 (emphasis added, quotation omitted). Accordingly, the terms of the Trust
provide an exclusive method, and Subparagraph (b) does not apply.
Thus, the only issue is whether subparagraph (a) applies here.
Subparagraph (a) allows the settlor to revoke or amend "by substantially complying
with a method provided in the terms of the trust." The Partial Revocation and
Amendment fails this requirement because, despite its title, it is not a revocation. It is
an amendment.
"Revocation is the resumption by the settlor of possession and title to the trust
property, free of any obligation to the beneficiaries." George G. Bogert & George T.
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (3d ed. 2006); In re Estate of Stern, 636 N.E.2d 939,
942 (111. App. 1994). This definition is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
definition. "[T]he ordinary meaning of 'revoke' is 'to annul by recalling or taking
back.'" Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S. Ct. 1795, 1809 (2000)
(citation omitted).
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Ira did not resume possession and title to any of the Trust assets. lathe Partial
Revocation and Amendment, Ira only modified a few of the Trust provisions. That is
an amendment, not a revocation.
Jeffrey asks this Court to join his semantic game of distinguishing between a
"mere amendment"9 and the somehow more substantive "revoke and insert" system
of modifying trust language, which Ira employed. There is no difference. No matter
what label is applied, no trust revocation has occurred. Ira only amended the terms of
the Trust.
But even if the Partial Revocation and Amendment is considered a revocation,
it does not substantially comply with the terms of the Trust. Both this Court and the
Court of Appeals have used the terms "substantial compliance" and "substantial
performance" interchangeably. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998);
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424-5 (Utah Ct. App.1994). In
Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDept of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), this
Court held:
Substantial performance exists where there has been no willful
departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission in essential
points, and the contract has been honestly and faithfully performed in its
material and substantial particulars. A party has substantially performed
when the only variance from the strict and literal performance consists
of technical or unimportant omissions or defects.
Id. at 1370 (quotes and citations omitted).

9

Jeffrey acknowledges a "mere amendment" is inadequate to completely
terminate a vested remainder under Banks v. Means. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 4.
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There are several ways in which the Partial Revocation and Amendment fails
to substantially comply with the terms of Ira's Trust. First, Ira willfully departed from
the terms of the Trust. The Partial Revocation and Amendment explicitly states it is
not a complete revocation, and expressly rejects this Court's interpretation of
language identical to Ira's Trust in Banks. (R. 360.) Second, Ira did not revoke the
Trust "in its material and substantial particulars." He only changed a few lines of the
20-page, single spaced Trust. Third, Ira did not return all of the Trust assets to
himself. Ira did not return any of the Trust assets to himself. Ira's performance was
flawed far beyond technical or unimportant details. It was fundamentally and
materially flawed.10
Jeffrey cites Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081
(10th Cir. 1995), which is actually contrary to a finding of substantial compliance here.
In Joseph A, the court held the contract doctrine of substantial compliance "is simply
a doctrine to assist the court in determining whether conduct should, in reality, be
considered the equivalent of compliance under the contract." Id. at 1085-6. As
discussed above, Ira's actions cannot be considered the equivalent of compliance
under the terms of Ira's Trust.

10

Jeffrey argues the trial court failed to address an issue of fact, i.e., whether the
Partial Revocation and Amendment substantially complied with the terms of Ira's
Trust. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 27. In Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 1998)
this Court held, "The issue of whether substantial compliance with the renewal clause
is sufficient to constitute an exercise thereof is a question of law which this court
reviews for correctness."
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Jeffrey argues that the Partial Revocation and Amendment should be treated
differently than the amendment in Banks because Ira amended Paragraph 3.2 to state
that the beneficial interests were not vested. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 23. The additional
amendment to Ira's trust makes no difference. As discussed above, this Court has
held that an amendment is inadequate to completely terminate a vested remainder.
Ira's Trust requires a complete revocation of the Trust.
Under the terms of Ira's Trust, Jeffrey's vested remainder is an integral and
permanent part of the Trust. Ira could have reduced the scope of Jeffrey's vested
remainder as was done in Flake, but he could not completely terminate Thomas'
vested interest without completely revoking the Trust. Taking the additional step of
amending Paragraph 3.2 does not cause the Partial Revocation and Amendment to
become a complete revocation or even a substantially complete revocation. It is not a
revocation at all.
Jeffrey also asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 "superseded" Banks v.
Means. Jeffrey's Brief p. 25. Jeffrey provides no analysis to support this assertion
other than the fact that the statute was adopted after this Court decided Banks. The
statute became effective on July 1, 2004, yet this Court decided Hoggan in 2007 and
applied Banks. This Court did not see fit to find the statute had superseded Banks,
and there is no reason to do so now.
There is no inconsistency between the statute and Banks. At most, the statute
allows the settlor to substantially comply with the terms of the trust, while Banks
requires the settlor to strictly comply with those terms. Thus, even if the statute
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applied here (which it does not because of Jeffrey's failure to raise the issue in a
timely manner), the statute is of no assistance to Jeffrey. Ira did not even
substantially comply with the terms of his Trust, so the Partial Revocation and
Amendment is ineffective.
IV.

JEFF PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IRA'S TRUST WAS
THE RESULT OF A MISTAKE OF FACT OR LAW UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-415.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 states:
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to
conform the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and
convincing evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the
trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement.
Jeff claims "the Partial Revocation evidenced that Ira's original Trust was in
fact affected by a mistake of law." Appellant's Brief at 33. The Partial Revocation
and Amendment says nothing about Ira's understanding and intention at the time he
signed the Trust on July 15, 1991. At most, it reflects Ira's understanding on May 9,
2003, when he executed the Partial Revocation and Amendment
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 comment (a) states, "The intention of
the settlor that determines the terms of the trust is the intention at the time of the
creation of the trust and not a subsequent intention." See also Culbertson v. Peoples
Bank, 375 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 164, comment (b)); White Mtn. Apache Tribe v. United States\ 249 F.3d
1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4, comment
(a)); Aiello v. Clark 680 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Alaska 1984).
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Discovery was complete at the time the trial court heard Thomas' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Jeffrey presented no evidence to the trial court that Ira's
Trust was the result of a mistake of fact or law. The unambiguous language of Ira's
Trust shows that Ira intended to limit his (and Avis') ability to disinherit their children
in the future.
At one point in his Brief, Jeffrey appears to address Ira's original intent, but it
is just a repetition of Jeffrey's argument regarding Ira's later intent. Jeffrey states the
obvious, that "the purpose of Ira's Trust was to effectuate the distribution of Ira's
property after his death in accordance with his expressed desires, intentions and
instructions." Jeffrey's Brief p. 27. Jeffrey then states that the Partial Revocation and
Amendment did not frustrate that purpose because it represented "his intention and
desire to disinherit Tom." Id. p. 28. The same was true in Banks, and this Court
found the amendment ineffective. Ira's Trust limited Ira's ability to disinherit
Thomas, and there is no evidence that the limitation was the result of a mistake of fact
or law. Therefore, Ira's later desire to avoid that limitation is irrelevant. Ira was
obligated to abide by the terms of the Trust he voluntarily executed.
Jeffrey cites to a footnote in Hoggan that "the term 'vested subject to complete
divestment' is more of an oxymoron than a meaningful legal term...." 2007 UT 78 ^
11 fn.2. Jeffrey argues that because of this, Ira's use of the phrase must have been a
mistake of law. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 34. Again, Jeffrey did not present any evidence to
the trial court to support his theory that Ira did not intend to limit his ability to
disinherit his children in the future. Furthermore, this Court did not overrule Banks in
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Hoggan. To the contrary, this Court cited it repeatedly as binding precedent. Id. at
^ 11-13. The footnote Jeffrey cites appears to be more of an instruction to future
trust drafters than a shift in trust interpretation. Regardless of the Trust's use of an
oxymoron, the fact remains that Ira's Trust created vested beneficial interests that
could not be terminated without a complete revocation of the Trust. There was no
mistake of fact or law here.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED
IRA'S ESTATE PLAN REGARDING IRA'S PERSONAL
PROPERTY.
Paragraph 2.1(b) of Ira's Will states, in pertinent part:

Contingent Gift. I give all of my tangible personal property not
effectively disposed by [a written statement under Paragraph 2.1(a)], or
otherwise specifically devised in this Will, except any such property
which, at the time of my death, is used in a trade or business, to my
spouse if my spouse survives me. If my spouse fails to survive me, I
give such property to my issue who survive me....
Ira's Codicil did not change Paragraph 2.1.
Ira's Codicil only amended Paragraph 3.1, regarding the personal representative.
Paragraph 2 of the Codicil states, "All other terms, conditions, distributions, and
provisions of my Will are hereby republished, and shall remain in force and effect."
Summary judgment is appropriate when a document is integrated and
unambiguous. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App. 126 % 14, 977 P.2d 550. Ira's Will and
Ira's Codicil are integrated and unambiguous. They clearly state Thomas is entitled to
one-half of the personal property included in Ira's estate.
Jeffrey attempts to show an ambiguity in Ira's Will arising from Paragraph 2.2,
which states in part, "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property, not
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effectively disposed of by the above written statement or by other provisions of this
Will... to the Trustee of [Ira's Trust]...." Jeffrey attempts to equate the language in
Paragraph 2.1(b), which deals with all tangible personal property not listed in a
written statement under Paragraph 2.1(a) "or otherwise specifically devised in this
Will", with the language of Paragraph 2.2, which deals with property of any type not
disposed in the written statement "or by other provision of this Will". There is no
"circularity" as Jeffrey asserts. There are no specific bequests and Ira did not prepare
a written statement, so Paragraph 2.1(b) disposes of all personal property, and
Paragraph 2.2 disposes of all other property. Paragraph 2.2 does not dispose of Ira's
personal property, because Paragraph 2.1(c) specifically disposes of Ira's personal
property.
Even if these could be considered inconsistent, the specific provision of
Paragraph 2.1(b) controls the more general provision of Paragraph 2.2. This Court
has applied this rule to statutory provisions. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608
P.2d 242 (Utah 1980) and other courts have applied it to estate planning documents.
Estate of Sawyer v. Commissioner\ T.C. Memo 1988-132, Floyd v. Floyd, 813 S.W.2d
758,761(Tex.Ct.App. 1991).
Jeffrey argues for the first time in his Brief that Ira's Trust controls the
distribution of Ira's tangible personal property. Jeffrey's Brief, p. 36. Jeffrey did not
make this argument before the trial court. Jeffrey never previously referred to
Schedule A of the Trust, and it is too late to do so now. State v. Babbell,
770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989).
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Jeffrey claims the trial court "should have reviewed Ira's Trust to properly
interpret Ira's intent with respect to the distribution of his personal property."
Jeffrey's Brief, p. 36. Jeffrey claims that if the trial court had done so, it would have
"discovered" Schedule A. It was not the trial court's job to review Irals Trust to
discover Schedule A. That is Jeffrey's and his counsel's job.
But even if Jeffrey had preserved the issue for appeal, Ira's Trust only relates
to tangible personal property he possessed as of July 15, 1991. Paragraph 3.4 of Ira's
Trust states that after acquired personal property "may be added" to the Trust, but
there is no evidence that any such property was ever actually added. Furthermore,
Schedule A does not identify any particular assets, so it is impossible to determine
what Schedule A is referring to.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth here, Thomas requests this Court to affirm the
judgment of the trial court in granting summary judgment to Thomas with regard to
Ira's Trust and Ira's Will.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on July 12, 2010.
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ADDENDUM
A.

Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190
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trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and
manage it for the benefit of the beneficial les
5. Trusts <s=>31
Once the settlor has created a trust he is
no longer the owner of the trust property
and has only such ability to deal with it as is
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument
6. Trusts <s=>58, 59(2)
A settlor has the power to modify or
revoke a trust only if and to the extent that
such power is explicitly reserved by the
terms of the trust
7. Trusts &=>1

Settlor's children brought action against
settlor's sister, seeking enforcement of trust
agreement that sister claimed was modified
by an amendment under which sister would
become the sole beneficiary of the trust The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Frank G Noel, J , granted summary judgment for children Sister appealed The Supreme Court, Durham, C J , held that
amendment to trust was ineffective
Affirmed

1. Appeal and Error <^934(1)
When reviewing the trial court's ruling
in a motion for summary judgment, appellate
court considers all facts and inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmovmg party

The creation of a trust involves the
transfer of property interests in the trust
subject-matter to the beneficianes, and these
interests cannot be taken from the beneficianes except m accordance with a provision of
the trust instrument
8. Trusts <s=>59(2)
Under trust agreement stating that beneficianes had vested interests that continued
until trust was "revoked or terminated," complete revocation was required to divest beneficianes of vested interests
9. Trusts <S=>58

3. Appeal and Error ®=>856(1)

Amendment to trust, purporting to
change trust beneficianes and successor
trustee from settlor's children to her sister,
was ineffective, as amendment sought to
change beneficiary status of children, divesting them of their vested interests in trust,
but trust agreement provided that children's
beneficiary interests were only subject to
divestiture via a revocation of the trust,
which amendment did not achieve

Appellate court may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any ground available
to the trial court, even if it was not relied
upon by the trial court

James H Faust, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs

2. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1)
Appellate court reviews the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness,
according no deference to that court's legal
conclusions

4. Trusts e=>134,182
A trust is a form of ownership in which
the legal title to property is vested in a

J Jay Bullock, Clinton J Bullock, Karen
Bullock Kreeck, Salt Lake City, for defendant

BANKS v MEANS

Utah
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Cite as 52 P 3d 1190 (Utah 2002)

DURHAM, Chief Justice
INTRODUCTION
111 Decedent's children, Kenneth Alan
Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and Bransford
Michael Banks brought an action against decedent's sistei, Nancy Means ("Ms Means")
seeking enforcement of a 1992 trust that was
purportedly modified by a 1999 amendment
Under the terms of the 1999 amendment,
Ms Means would become the sole beneficiary of the trust, while the Banks children
would become contingent beneficiaries The
trial court granted summary judgment m
favor of the Banks children Ms Means
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
by (1) granting the Banks children's motion
for summary judgment, (2) denying Ms
Mean's cross-motion for summary judgment,
and (3) admitting the deposition testimony of
attorney Joseph L Piatt We affiim the
trial court's grant of summary judgment and
hold that the 1999 amendment did not effect
a revocation of the trust as required by the
trust language Theiefore, the terms of the
original trust document govern the disposition of the trust estate and the remaining
issues are moot

BACKGROUND
112 On April 15, 1992, the decedent, Betty
A Banks ("Ms Banks"), executed a document
entitled the "Betty A Banks Family Protection Trust," which was prepared by her attorney, Joseph L Piatt ("Mr Piatt") As required by the terms of the trust, Ms Banks,
as settlor, transferred certain property into
the trust and served as trustee until her
death on August 24, 1999

DERSIGNED," designates the Banks children as joint beneficiaries of the trust estate
upon Ms Banks' death
Article VI,
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," names the
Banks children as joint successor_trustees
H 4 The trust agreement provides that the
trust is revocable, and that Ms Banks, as
settlor, can amend certain portions of the
trust, subject to the provisions of the trust
language Article III provides
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION
ADDITIONS TO TRUST

AND

31 Rights of the Undersigned
As
long as the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend,
modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in
part, including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such
principal Such revocation or amendment
of this Trust may be in whole or in part by
written instrument Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument
shall be effective only when such change is
delivered in writing to the then acting
Trustee On the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of
revocation, all of the Trust property
3 2 Interests of the Beneficiaries The
interests of the beneficiaries are presently
vested interests subject to divestment
which shall continue until this Trust is
revoked or terminated other than by
death As long as this Trust subsists, the
Trust properties and all the rights and
privileges hereunder shall be controlled
and exercised by the Trustee named herein in their fiduciary capacity

11 3 The trust provides that upon the death
11 5 In August 1999, Ms Banks executed an
of Ms Banks, the Banks children were to
share equally in the proceeds of the trust amendment to the trust The amendment
estate and serve as joint trustees Article I consists of three replacement pages inserted
of the trust, "PURPOSES AND BIRTH into the trust document It does not change
DATES," declares "This Trust is established article I of the trust, which states that the
for the primary benefit of the Undersigned trust's purpose is to benefit Ms Banks durduring the Undersigned's lifetime, for the ing her lifetime and her family thereafter,
Undersigned's family thereafter " The docu- and names the Banks children as her family
ment then names Ms Banks' family as Ken- The amendment does, however, change the
neth Alan Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and beneficiaries and the successor trustees
Bransford Michael Banks Article IV, "DIS- The amendment changes article IV, "DISPOPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UN- SITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UN-
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DERSIGNED," to allocate 100% of the trust
estate to Ms Banks' older sister, Ms Means,
on the death of Ms Banks, with the Banks
children listed as alternate beneficiaries
should Ms Means predecease Ms Banks
In addition, article VI of the amendment,
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," changes the
successor trustee to Ms Means, with the
Banks children to serve as joint successor
trustees if Ms Means predeceases Ms
Banks

upon below Bailey v Bayles, 2002 UT 58,
1110, 52 P3d 1158, Higgins v Salt Lake
County, 855 P 2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)
ANALYSIS

11 8 Ms Means argues that the trial court
erred when it (1) granted the Banks chil
dren's motion for summary judgment, (2)
denied Ms Means' motion for summary judgment, and (3) determined that the attorneyclient privilege did not protect Mr Piatt's
11 6 After Ms Banks died m August, 1999,
deposition statements l When the trial court
the parties disputed whether the 1999
granted summary judgment to the Banks
amendment or the original trust agreement
children, it found that their children's intergoverned the disposition of the trust On
est in the trust was vested subject to divestiOctober 14, 1999, the Banks children filed a
ture only through a revocation of the trust,
complaint against Ms Means seeking, among
that the trust was never revoked, and that
other things, a finding that they were the
the Banks children were therefore the sole
rightful trustees and beneficiaries of the
beneficiaries of the trust and entitled to retrust, and were therefore entitled to the trust
ceive disbursement of the trust corpus as set
proceeds Ms Means counterclaimed, asforth m the original trust document
serting that the 1999 amendment governed
the disposition of the trust and that she was
I THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL
the sole beneficiary After a series of moTRUST AGREEMENT
tions and cross motions, the trial court granted the Banks children's motion for summary
[4-7] U 9 It is well settled that "[a] trust
judgment, and this appeal followed
is a form of ownership in which the legal title
to property is vested in a trustee, who has
STANDARD OF REVIEW
equitable duties to hold and manage it for
[1-3] 11 7 Summary judgment is appropri- the benefit of the beneficiaries " Continen
ate where there are no genuine issues of tal Bank & Trust Co v Country Club Mo
material fact and the moving party is entitled bile Estates, Ltd., 632 P2d 869, 872 (Utah
1981)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts
to judgment as a matter of law Utah R
Civ P 56(c), Gerbich v Numed, Inc, 1999 § 2 (1959)) "[0]nce the settlor has created
UT 37,1110, 977 P 2d 1205 When reviewing the trust he is no longer the owner of the
the trial court's ruling m a motion for sum- trust property and has only such ability to
mary judgment, we consider all facts and deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light the trust instrument" Id (citing Boone v
most favorable to the nonmovmg party Pe- Dams, 64 Miss 133, 8 So 202 (1886)) Thus,
terson v Sunnder Corp, 2002 UT 43, 1113, a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a
446 Utah Adv Rep 40, 48 P3d 918 We trust only if and to the extent that such
review the trial court's grant of summary power is exphcitly reserved by the terms of
judgment for correctness, according no def- the trust Continental Bank, 632 P2d at
erence to that court's legal conclusions Ox- 872, see also Kline v Utah Dep't of Health,
endine v Overturf, 1999 UT 4, 117, 973 P 2d 776 P2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App 1989)(citmg
417, State v Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 330-331
1994) In addition, we may affirm a grant of (1959)), accord Clayton v Behle, 565 P2d
summary judgment on any ground available 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) Furthermore, "[tjhe
to the trial court, even if it was not relied creation of a trust involves the transfer of
1

These statements were relevant to the Banks
children s claim of undue influence or lack of
capacity to amend the trust because of our

disposition of the other questions on appeal we
do not reach this issue
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property mtei ests in the ti ust subject-matter
to the beneficiaries These interests cannot
be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument" George G Bogeit & George T
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d ed
rev 1983) Thus, our analysis begins with an
examination of the original ti ust language to
see what poweis Ms Banks reserved for
herself as the trustee and what beneficial
interests she created 2

and is not the same as an amendment or
modification
B

Beneficiary

Interests

[8] 1112 Next, we examine the trust
agreement to see what interests Ms Banks
created for the trust beneficiaries Section
3 2 reads, "Interests of the Beneficiaries
The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death "
By the plain language of the trust, the beneA
Revocation
ficiaries have "vested interests" 3 that conH 10 Article III, entitled "AMENDMENT,
tinue until the interests are "revoked or terREVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO
minated " Here, Ms Banks reserved the
TRUST," clearly reserves the settlor's nght power to revoke, modify, or amend the trust
to amend, modify or revoke the trust Sec- in whole or in part in section 3 1, but limited
tion 3 1 states "Rights of the Under- that power in section 3 2 with regard to the
signed
[T]he Undersigned reserves the beneficiaries Thus, a complete revocation
right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust was required to divest the beneficiaries of
in whole or in part
" The trust specifies their vested interests
that "revocation or amendment of this Trust
1113 Ms Means relies on In re Estate of
may be in whole oi in part by written instrument Amendment, modification or revoca- Groesbeck, 935 P 2d 1255 (Utah 1997) for the
tion of this instrument shall be effective only proposition that the language in section 3 2
when such change is delivered m writing to merely proves that the trust is not illusory
the then acting Trustee" However, the and does not restrict Ms Banks' rights to
trust mdicates that in the case of complete divest the Banks children of their vested
interests
Her reliance is misplaced
In
revocation, "the Trustee shall deliver to the
Groesbeck we held that a revocable trust can
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct
be created, without being deemed illusory, as
in the instrument of revocation, all of the
long as title to the property passes to the
Trust property" Thus, the trust specifies
trustee and vested interests are created in
that for Ms Banks to completely revoke the
the beneficiaries, even if these interests are
trust, all the property must be transferred
subject to divestiture Id. at 1257-58 (citing
back to Ms Banks, after which she could
Horn v First Sec Bank of Utah, N A , 548
presumably create a new trust or dispose of
P 2 d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)) That is, a
the property as she saw fit
reservation of the power to revoke does not
111 It is clear from the trust language make a trust invalid Id. at 1257 We furthat Ms Banks reserved for herself the pow- ther observed that vested beneficiary interer to amend, modify, or revoke the trust in ests are "subject to being divested by the
whole or in part Any such changes were to exercise of the reserved power to amend or
be specified in writing and delivered to her, revoke the indenture m trust" Id. at 1258
but in the case of a complete revocation, all Thus, we concluded that the trust was valid,
the property in the trust was also to be even though the Groesbecks had reserved
dehvered to Ms Banks Revocation is there- the right to revoke the trust and created
fore a specific provision of the trust language vested beneficiary interests that were subject
2

Ms Banks was the settlor of the trust the
Undersigned in the trust document and the
trustee of the trust once it was created

3

A vested interest is something [t]hat has
become a completed consummated right for
present or future enjoyment not contingent un

conditional absolute
[A]n interest
vested even where it does not carry a
immediate possession if it does confer
right of taking possession in the future
Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed 1999)

may be
right to
a fixed
Black s
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to divestiture via the specific piovisions of
the trust itself4 Id at 1258 Groesbeck,
therefore, does not require us to disregard
the requirements of the trust language
1114 Ms Banks reserved the right to
amend, modify, or i evoke the trust, specified
how such changes were to be accomplished,
and cieated vested beneficiary interests that
could be divested only though a complete
revocation of the trust
Our next step,
therefore, is to look to the 1999 amendment
to see whether it complied with the terms of
the trust

trust in the 1999 amendment
In other
words, the 1999 amendment did not effect a
revocation of the trust that would have properly divested the Banks children- of theu
vested interests under the terms of the trust
itself As we have previously stated, "[e]ven
a revocable trust clothes beneficiaries
with a legally enfoiceable right to insist that
the terms of the trust be adhered to " Con
tinental Bank & Trust Co v Country Club
Mobile Estates, Ltd, 632 P 2d 869, 872 (Utah
1981)
CONCLUSION

II

THE 1999 AMENDMENT

[9] 1115 The 1999 amendment contains
two primary changes First, it changes article IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH
OF THE UNDERSIGNED," to allocate
100% of the trust estate to Ms Means on the
death of Ms Banks Second, article VI,
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," changes Ms
Banks' successor trustee from the Banks
children to Ms Means, unless Ms Means
predeceases Ms Banks
Thus, the 1999
amendment sought to change the beneficiary
status of the Banks children, thereby divesting them of their vested interests in the
trust 5 As discussed earlier, the Banks children had vested interests in the trust which
could only be divested according to the terms
of the original trust document Therefore,
the 1999 amendment falls within the purview
of article III, section 3 2 of the trust, which
provides that beneficiary interests are only
subject to divestiture via a revocation of the
trust, and section 3 1, which requires that
upon revocation the trust property must be
delivered to Ms Banks

1117 We affirm the distnct court's grant of
summary judgment to the Banks children
and find that the Betty A Banks Family
Protection Trust dated April 15, 1992, governs the disposition of the estate of Betty A
Banks
1118 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT,
Justice HOWE, Justice RUSSON, and
Justice WILKINS concur in Chief Justice
DURHAM'S opinion

2002 UT 67

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
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and Appellant.
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1116 Neither of these requirements were
met Ms Banks did not divest the Banks
children of their vested interests in the trust
because she did not completely revoke the

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, J Dennis

4

5

The Groesbeck trust language was remarkably
similar to the trust language at issue here The
interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked
or terminated other than by death
Id at 1258
In that case however we were not called upon
to determine whether a revocation had taken
place that would have divested the beneficiaries
of their interests Id

Also notable is what the 1999 amendment did
not do It did not change the language in article
I stating that the purpose of the trust was for
Ms Banks and her family thereafter or the spe
cific identifications by name and birthdate of the
Banks children as her family Accepting Ms
Means interpretation of the 1999 amendment
would thus render some language null and void
and contravene the stated purpose of the Betty A
Banks Family Protection Trust

